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I. CONQUEST TO CONFEDERATION 
On a battlefield almost 250 years ago, General Wolfe faced the 
Marquis de Montcalm and the dream of une Amérique française died. La 
Nouvelle-France, even then commonly known as Canada, became a 
British colony and the status of the language of Molière became 
uncertain, threatened and the source of conflict ever since. The 
constitutional status of the French language today in Canada, the 
direction in which it is headed, and the influence the Honourable Michel 
Bastarache has exerted over these issues is the subject of this paper.  
Although the intention of the British Empire to assimilate its newest 
acquisition is beyond doubt, the French fact, that is, the overwhelming 
majority of French-speaking inhabitants north of the American colonies, 
presented a significant challenge to achieving this goal. As Michel 
Bastarache
1
 states: “The efforts to achieve religious and cultural 
assimilation … were doomed to failure and, as early as 1774, the Quebec 
Act … (largely) re-established the old French law.”
2
 By the time the 
numerical superiority of Francophones was waning, the battle lines were 
clearly drawn. In the midst of political agitation for responsible 
government in the British North American colonies, Lord Durham 
famously wrote:  
I expected to find a contest between a government and a people: I 
found two nations warring in the bosom of a single state: I found a 
struggle, not of principles, but of races; and I perceived that it would be 
idle to attempt any amelioration of laws or institutions until we could 
                                                                                                             
 Director of the Constitutional Law Branch, Ministry of the Attorney General, Ontario. 
The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Ministry. 
1 I will refer to the Hon. Michel Bastarache as “Michel Bastarache” when writing or 
speaking prior to his appointment to the Bench in 1995 and as “Justice Bastarache” thereafter. 
2 Michel Bastarache, “Language Rights in the Supreme Court of Canada: The Perspective 
of Chief Justice Dickson” (1991) 20 Man. L.J. 392, at 392 [hereinafter “Bastarache, ‘The Dickson 
Perspective’”]. 
378 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2009), 47 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
first succeed in terminating the deadly animosity that now separates the 




Lord Durham’s Report led to the Union Act, 1840, joining Lower 
and Upper Canada. Although Lower Canada comprised 60 per cent of 
the population of the united Canadas, representation in the new assembly 
was divided equally between the two former colonies. In addition, of the 
600,000 residents of Lower Canada, 150,000 were British. Hence, 
Anglophones comprised the majority of the new combined electorate.
4
  
Article 41 of the Union Act, 1840 provided that all written or printed 
material issued by the Legislative Council or Legislative Assembly 
“shall be in the English language only”. While the law did not prohibit 
translation, it expressly declared that translations were not official. 
Article 41 was revoked nine years later by the Imperial Parliament at 




By most measures, the union of Upper and Lower Canada was a 
failure and did little to address either the aspirations of or the divisions 
between these two nations. Arguably one success was the development 
of political leaders, who by way of elite accommodation, could find ways 
to govern both polities in a manner not unacceptable to each other. 
Nevertheless deadlock between the Canada East and Canada West was 
all too common and the need for a different solution pressed; hence the 
move towards Confederation. What Robert Baldwin and Louis-Hippolyte 
LaFontaine did for the united Province of Canada, John A. Macdonald 
and George-Étienne Cartier did for the new Dominion of Canada. 
II. CONFEDERATION TO THE QUIET REVOLUTION 
It is difficult to understand the divisive nature of language rights in 
Canada without understanding the nature of Confederation. The view 
that most closely accords with the text of the Constitution Act, 1867 has 
                                                                                                             
3 C.P. Lucas, Lord Durham’s Report on the Affairs of British North America (1912), at 16, 
per Claude Belanger. See online: Marianopolis College, <http://www.faculty.marianopolis.edu/ 
c.belanger/QuebecHistory/docs/durham/1.htm>. 
4 Denis Vaugeois, “A Language Without Status” in The French Language in Quebec: 400 
Years of History and Life, Conseil superieure de la langue francaise, translated by Abigail Ratcliffe. 
See online: Conseil supérieure de la langue française: <http://www.cslf.gouv.qc.ca/publications/ 
PubF156.ang/Part%20Two/chapter%203/Article%2011/All_A_Language_Without_Status.pdf>. 
5 Id. 
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it that language and culture would be governed largely at the provincial 
level. In other words, the French language and culture would be 
protected by the Legislature of Quebec. As the Supreme Court of Canada 
put it in the Quebec Secession Reference:  
The federal structure adopted at Confederation enabled French-speaking 
Canadians to form a numerical majority in the province of Quebec, and 
so exercise the considerable provincial powers conferred by the 




Hence, exclusive provincial legislative authority exists over education, 
municipal institutions, property and civil rights, the establishment of 
courts and the administration of justice as well as matters of a local and 
private nature.
7
 With small deference to the need to ensure a modicum of 
accommodation for the participation of the minority Francophone 
population in federal institutions, section 133 of the Constitution Act, 
1867 guarantees the right to use either French or English in the federal 
Parliament and federally established courts, as well as the requirement 
that federal statutes be published in both languages.  
Even the modest guarantees under section 133 were contingent upon 
Quebec accepting to be subject to the same strictures in regard to its 
provincial assembly, courts and statutes. Although section 133 was not 
made applicable to any of the other original uniting provinces, it was 
extended to Manitoba upon its entry into Confederation.
8
 
From this perspective of Confederation, the survival of the French 
language and culture would depend on the people and government of 
Quebec. Developments after Confederation intended to do away with the 
use of the French language in other parts of the country, notably in New 
Brunswick, Ontario and Manitoba, would confirm this view of 
Confederation to the dismay of many French-Canadians. In response, an 
alternative interpretation of Confederation developed which was 
premised on a compact between two nations (or two founding peoples): 
English Canada and French Canada. As put by the noted founder of Le 
Devoir, Henri Bourassa, in 1904: 
La base de la Confédération, c’est la dualité des races, la dualité des 
langues, garantie par l’égalité des droits. Ce pacte devrait mettre fin au 
                                                                                                             
6 Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.J. No. 61, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, at para. 59 
(S.C.C.). 
7 Constitution Act, 1867, (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, ss. 92(8), (13), (14), (16), 93. 
8 Manitoba Act, 1870, 33 Vict., c. 3, s. 23. 
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conflit des races et des Églises et assurer à tous, catholiques et protestants, 
Français et Anglais, une parfaite égalité des droits dans toute l’étendue 
de la Confédération canadienne.
9
  
This alternative interpretation gained traction and by 1963 the 
Government of Canada established the Royal Commission on Bilingualism 
and Biculturalism with a mandate to: 
… inquire into and report upon the existing state of bilingualism and 
biculturalism in Canada and to recommend what steps should be taken 
to develop the Canadian Confederation on the basis of an equal 
partnership between the two foundings races …
10
  
III. OFFICIAL LANGUAGES ACT, 1969 
The B & B Report led to the enactment in 1969 of the Official 
Languages Act providing for a degree of official bilingualism at the 
federal level throughout Canada. The Act declared the equality of 
English and French: 
The English and French languages are the official languages of Canada 
for all purposes of the Parliament and Government of Canada, and 
possess and enjoy equality of status and equal rights and privileges as 




The meaning of the equality of both official languages is not self-
evident. For instance, the right to receive services from the federal 
government in the official language of choice was subject to demographic 
requirements. The B & B Commission sought an approach “determined 
by the realities of Canadian life”.
12
 It adopted “an approach aimed at 
attaining the greatest equality with the least impracticality”.
13
 This meant 
that services should be available “wherever the minority is numerous 
enough to be viable as a group”.
14
 
                                                                                                             
9 Conseil supérieur de la langue française, Le français au Québec, 400 ans d’histoire et de 
vie (Montreal: Éditions Fides, 2008) encadré 26, at 147. 
10 Hugh R. Innis, Bilingualism and Biculturalism: An Abridged Version of the Royal 
Commission Report (Ottawa: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1973), foreword [hereinafter “B & B 
Report”]. 
11 S.C. 1968-69, c. 54 (now R.S.C. 1985, c. 31 (4th Supp.)) [hereinafter “OLA”]. 
12 B & B Report, supra, note 10, at 20. 
13 Id., at 21. 
14 Id. 
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IV. CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 
The enactment in 1982 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms
15
 established a watershed in the constitutional entrenchment of 
language rights in Canada. Sections 16 to 22, entitled the “Official 
Languages of Canada” entrenches the key aspects of the OLA. In much 
the same language of the OLA, section 16 declares the official status and 
equality of French and English. Sections 17 to 19 reiterate the language 
rights of section 133 of the Constitution Act, 1867 as they relate to the 
federal government. Section 20 entrenches the right to receive services 
from the federal government in the official language of choice in much 
the same language as the OLA.  
The most noteworthy change is the absence of any express reference 
to Quebec in sections 16 to 22 of the Charter and the presence of special 
provisions under which New Brunswick subjects itself to language rights 
equal to and beyond those applicable to the federal government. For 
instance, under section 20(2), New Brunswick must provide services in 
both official languages without reference to demographic criteria. More 
significantly still, section 16.1 (added in 1993) provides that the English 
and French “linguistic communities” (not merely the languages) have 
“equality of status and equal rights” including: 
… the right to distinct educational institutions and such distinct cultural 
institutions as are necessary for the preservation and promotion of those 
communities. 
As an influential and active minority language rights advocate with 
broad roots in New Brunswick, it is difficult not to see Michel 
Bastarache’s influence in these constitutional provisions.
16
 As he wrote 
in 1991: 
Fighting assimilation, therefore, requires a degree of linguistic  
institutional completeness which, I submit, can only be achieved 
through meaningful constitutional protection.
17
 
                                                                                                             
15 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
16 New Brunswick, Vers l’égalité des langues officielles au Nouveau-Brunswick : rapport 
du groupe d’étude sur les langues officielles (Fredericton : Direction des langues officielles, 1982) 
[hereinafter “Poirier-Bastarache Report”]. Michel Bastarache is described as “one of the artisans of 
New Brunswick’s bilingual status” in The Great Names of the French-Canadian Community. See 
online: <http://franco.ca/edimage/grandspersonnages/en/carte_v04.html>. 
17 Bastarache, “The Dickson Perspective”, supra, note 2, at 400. 
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The expression “linguistic institutional completeness” is a reference to 
the idea that one important factor permitting a linguistic minority to 
resist assimilation is the existence of a sufficient array of institutions 
serving the minority in its own language.
18
 
Undoubtedly, the most significant change in language rights 
entrenched by the Charter are minority-language educational rights 
guaranteed under section 23, described by the Supreme Court of Canada 
as “the cornerstone of minority language rights protection”.
19
 For the first 
time, official language minorities are guaranteed the right to instruction 
in their own language, minority-language schools and minority-language 
school boards where warranted by their population. For Francophones 




For Francophones outside Quebec, Charter section 23 was also the 
righting of an egregious wrong. While, as noted above, the only 
constitutional protection for minority-language rights guaranteed under 
the Constitution Act, 1867 is that contained in section 133, many 
assumed that the denominational school protection of Roman Catholic 
schools in section 93 implicitly guaranteed French-language separate 
schools. As the Commissioner of Official Languages put it: 
Section 93 enshrines the rights of Protestant and Roman Catholic 
minorities to denominational schools in provinces where they are 
already recognized, which — at a time when language is intimately 
associated with religious affiliation — amounts to recognition of 
language rights in education
21
 
Michel Bastarache criticized the 1917 Privy Council decision
22
 which 
held the contrary in relation to Ontario’s 1912 Regulation 17 and 
prohibited instruction in the French language and noted the decision’s 
long-term negative consequences:  
                                                                                                             
18 Lalonde v. Ontario (Commission de restructuration des services de santé), [2001] O.J. 
No. 4767, 56 O.R. (3d) 505, at 537 (Ont. C.A.); Gigliotti v. Conseil d’Administration du Collège des 
Grands Lacs, [2005] O.J. No. 2762, at para. 48 (Ont. Div. Ct.); Fédération Franco-ténoise v. 
Canada (Attorney General), [2006] N.W.T.J. No. 33, at para. 613 (N.W.T.S.C.). 
19 Solski (Tutor of) v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 14, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 
201, at para. 3 (S.C.C.). 
20 The English-language minority of Quebec had always enjoyed, in practice, access to 
minority-language schools. 
21 Canada, Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages, Annual Report, Special 
Edition 35th Anniversary 1969 – 2004 (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services 
Canada, 2005). 
22 Ottawa Separate Schools Trustees v. Mackell, [1917] A.C. 62 (P.C.). See also 
Bastarache, “The Dickson Perspective”, supra, note 2, at 393. 
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L’intention évidente de garantir l’utilisation du français dans le 
domaine scolaire, dans l’article 93 de la même loi, s’est avérée un 
échec important. Cet échec a donné lieu à des conflits sociaux et 
politiques qui ont marqué profondément l’histoire politique.
23
 
V. CHAMPION OF EQUALITY IN LANGUAGE RIGHTS  
1. The French Language Advocate 
As I am neither historian nor biographer, I am not in a position to 
describe Michel Bastarache’s language rights legacy in terms of his 
actual influence over the remarkable legislative and constitutional 
developments that have taken place in Canada over the last few decades. 
Suffice it to say he has left many footprints of his active journey and was 
well described as “le justicier des minorités francophones”.
24
  
A few milestones are demonstrative.
25
 He was a member of the New 
Brunswick Task Force on Official Languages and co-wrote the near 500-
page 1982 report, Towards the Equality of the Official Languages in New 
Brunswick.
26
 As a law professor and lawyer he advised governments and 
numerous French-language school boards as well as many agencies and 
organizations across Canada that promote French language rights. In 




He was so well known as an advocate of French language rights that 
the provincial government brought a motion for recusal to prevent him 
from sitting on the panel of the Supreme Court of Canada’s hearing of 
the appeal in Arsenault-Cameron v. Prince Edward Island. The Chief 
                                                                                                             
23 Michel Bastarache, “L’Égalité réelle des communautés de langue officielle du Canada” 
(2005) 7 Rev. de la Common Law en Français, at 18 [hereinafter “Bastarache, ‘L’Égalité réelle des 
communautés’”). 
24 Lucie Pacquet, “L’Honorable Michel Bastarache, R 922, Finding Aid 2156, prepared for 
Library and Archives Canada, online: <http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca.>. 
25 For a comprehensive description of this journey, see id. 
26 Poirier-Bastarache Report, supra, note 16. 
27 Marchand v. Simcoe Board of Education (No. 2), [1987] O.J. No. 949, 61 O.R. (2d) 651 
(Ont. H.C.J.); Reference re Public Schools Act (Man.), [1990] M.J. No. 68, 64 Man. R. (2d) 1 (Man. 
C.A.), revd [1993] S.C.J. No. 26, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 839 (S.C.C.); Mahe v. Alberta, [1985] A.J. No. 
1066, 64 A.R. 35 (Alta. Q.B.), affd [1987] A.J. No. 709, 80 A.R. 161 (Alta. C.A.), affd [1990] S.C.J. 
No. 19, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 342 (S.C.C.); Reference re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] S.C.J. No. 
36, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721 (S.C.C.); R. v. Mercure, [1988] S.C.J. No. 11, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 234 (S.C.C.); 
Ottawa Roman Catholic Separate School Board v. Ottawa Carleton French Language School 
Board, [1989] O.J. No. 425 (Ont. H.C.J.), [1989] O.J. No. 702, 68 O.R. (2d) 635 (Ont. C.A.); 
Reference re Schools Act (P.E.I.C.A.), [1988] P.E.I.J. No. 24, 69 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 236 (P.E.I.S.C.A.D.). 
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Justice left the decision to him. He held that his recusal was not 
warranted. In his judgment, he relied on a decision of the Constitutional 
Court of South Africa that recusal could not be “founded on a 
relationship of advocate unless the advocacy was regarding the case to be 
heard”. He also relied on an earlier decision of Cory J. that held: 
The requirement for neutrality does not require judges to discount the 
very life experiences that may so well qualify them to preside over 
disputes. It has been observed that the duty to be impartial  
does not mean that a judge does not, or cannot bring to the 
bench many existing sympathies, antipathies or attitudes. … 
True impartiality does not require that the judge have no 
sympathies or opinions; it requires that the judge nevertheless 
be free to entertain and act upon different points of view with 
an open mind.  
It is obvious that good judges will have a wealth of personal and 
professional experience, that they will apply with sensitivity and 
compassion to the cases that they must hear.
28
  
More germane to my assessment, Michel Bastarache is also the 
author of numerous writings on official language rights in Canada. He is 
the editor of the text Language Rights in Canada, published in French 
and English and now in its second edition.29 Marc Tremblay characterizes 
Michel Bastarache’s contribution as author in the first edition as one of 
ardent defender of linguistic minorities and advocate for the reform of 
language rights in Canada.
30
 Michel Bastarache has also written 




Michel Bastarache has identified the power dynamic between the 
English and French linguistic communities as the dominant social feature 
of Canadian society, national political life and constitutional history: 
                                                                                                             
28 Arsenault-Cameron v. Prince Edward Island, [1999] S.C.J. No. 75, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 851, 
at para. 3 (S.C.C) (citation omitted). 
29 Michel Bastarache, ed., Language Rights in Canada, 2d ed. (Cowansville: Éditions Yvon 
Blais, 2004), translation by Devinat et Associés. Michel Bastarache, ed., Les droits linguistiques au 
Canada (Montreal: Éditions Yvon Blais, 1986). 
30 Marc Tremblay, “Book Review: Les droits linguistiques au Canada” (2005-06) 37 
Ottawa L. Rev. 339. 
31 Terry Waltenbury, “Judging the Judges: The Bastarache Record” (1997) 9:1 
Constitutional Forum includes a list. See also list referred to supra, note 24. 
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La société canadienne a été marqué par les rapports de force entre ses 
deux principaux groupes linguistiques plus que par tout autre fait 
social. Les attitudes de ces groups linguistiques ont en effet façonné la 
vie politique nationale depuis les débuts de la Confédération et ont joué 
un rôle dominant dans l’histoire constitutionnelle.
32
 
The conflict between these two linguistic communities also reflected 
his personal experience growing up in Moncton, New Brunswick: 
It was seriously divided by language issues and marked by frequent and 
highly publicized incidents of language discrimination. Language 
communities were isolated and in constant conflict. … Social conflicts 
disturbed me and I soon came to believe that language guarantees were 
the best means of avoiding tensions because they remove discretion 
from the issues which divide the community. … This is why I was 
inspired to become an advocate for language rights.
33
 
The central theme of his writings on language rights is the pursuit of 
substantive equality between the two official language communities of 
Canada. He describes the constitutional recognition of language rights in 
Canada as a necessary condition for Confederation,
34
 although he 
acknowledges that the textual scope of the right in the Constitution Act, 
1867 reflects “a very imperfect compromise”.
35
 In the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms, he finds the answer: equality. He expressly 
rejects the narrower interpretations of equality as freedom from 
discrimination, the right to reasonable accommodation or special 
privileges for the minority in favour of substantive equality based on the 
equality of the two official linguistic communities: 
L’importance de cesser de traiter les groupes linguistiques comme des 
minorités bénéficiant de certains privilèges et d’accepter que les 
communautés culturelles sont des partenaires égaux qui doivent 
construire ensemble l’ordre social me semble évidente.
36
  
                                                                                                             
32 Michel Bastarache, “La consécration des langues officielles dans la Charte canadienne 
des droits et libertés”, in Bâtir une société juste, Library and Archives Canada. See online: 
<http://www.lac-bac.gc.ca./droits-et-libertes/023021-1100-f.html>. 
33 Andrew Gray & Eleni Yiannakis, “Language, Culture and Interpretation: An Interview 
with Mr. Justice Michel Bastarache” (2000) 58 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 73, at 79 [hereinafter “Gray & 
Yiannakis”]. 
34 Michel Bastarache, “La Charte canadiene des droits et libertés, reflet d’un phénomè 
mondial?” (2007) 48 C. de D. 735, at para. 15: “Il s’agit, de fait, d’un compromis politique qui a 
permis de donner naissance à notre pays.” 
35 In original text: “Un compromis très imparfait, marqué par l’asymétrie des droits” in 
Bâtir une société juste, Library and Archives Canada. See online: <http://www.lac-bac.gc.ca./droits-
et-libertes/023021-1100-f.html>. 
36 Bastarache, “L’Égalité réelle des communautés”, supra, note 23, at 12. 
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The essence of language rights in the Canadian Constitution is, 
arguably, based at least in part on the need to preserve the dignity and 
freedom of French and English speaking people in Canada. Social, 
political, economic, historical facts would seem to explain only the 
limited scope of the language rights recognized in the Constitution.
37
 
Michel Bastarache’s passionate promotion of the interpretation of 
language rights, premised upon the equality of the two official-language 
communities, entailed very significant implications. The most significant 
was his complete rejection of Justice Beetz’s incremental approach to the 
interpretation of language rights that attracted the support of the majority 
of the Supreme Court of Canada in 1986. Other implications which 
flowed from the first were (1) the importance of a generous interpretation 
designed to promote the development of official-language minorities and 
prevent assimilation; (2) the exercise of what he described as judicial 
activism to ensure that control was placed in the hands of the minority so 
as to protect it from what Alexis de Tocqueville famously described as 
the “tyranny of the majority”; and (3) the need for effective remedies. 
In Société des Acadiens du Nouveau-Brunswick v. Assn. of Parents 
for Fairness in Education, Beetz J. held for the majority of the Supreme 
Court of Canada that litigants were not entitled to be heard by a panel of 
judges that understood French without the aid of interpretation.
38
 The 
Société had argued that because one of the judges on the panel did not 
understand French sufficiently, this rendered illusory the right under 
section 19(2) of the Charter that either official language “may be used by 
any person” in the courts of New Brunswick. Relying on the nearly 
identical language of section 133 of the Constitution Act, 1867, Beetz J. 
interpreted the provisions to guarantee the right to use the language of 
choice rather than the right to be understood in that language unaided by 
interpretation.  
Similarly, in the companion case of McDonald v. Montreal (City), 
Beetz J. held for the majority that a summons issued by a court in the 
French language only did not infringe section 133 because anyone, 
including the Court, had the right to use either official language.
39
 In a 
nutshell, the right to use either official language imposed no corresponding 
obligation on the state.  
                                                                                                             
37 Bastarache, “The Dickson Perspective”, supra, note 2, at 396. 
38 [1986] S.C.J. No. 26, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 549 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Société des Acadiens”]; 
Michel Bastarache acted as counsel for School District 32, which was denied leave to intervene 
before the Court of Appeal in the case: [1986] N.B.J. No. 91 (N.B.C.A.). 
39 [1986] S.C.J. No. 28, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 460 (S.C.C.). 
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Justice Beetz’s restrictive interpretation of language rights was 
premised on his view that as they derived from political compromise and 
lacked the fundamental character as other rights, any expansion of their 
scope should be left to the political arena rather than to the courts. His 
approach cannot be divorced from the political context of the time in 
which the issue of minority language rights remained highly controversial 
and divisive. It was also well known at the time that while Ontario had 
refused to submit itself to a constitutionally entrenched official bilingualism 
despite federal pressure,
40
 it had adopted an incremental progressive 
legislative extension of French language rights over the years
41
 and Beetz 
J. was concerned to promote rather than impede this development: 
Unlike language rights which are based on political compromise, 
legal rights tend to be seminal in nature because they are rooted in 
principle. 
. . . . . 
This essential difference between the two types of rights dictates a 
distinct judicial approach with respect to each. More particularly, the 
courts should pause before they decide to act as instruments of change 
with respect to language rights. This is not to say that language rights 
provisions are cast in stone and should remain immune altogether from 
judicial interpretation. But, in my opinion, the courts should approach 
them with more restraint than they would in construing legal rights. 
. . . . . 
I think it is accurate to say that s. 16 of the Charter does contain a 
principle of advancement or progress in the equality of status or use of 
the two official languages. I find it highly significant however that this 
principle of advancement is linked with the legislative process referred 
to in s. 16(3). 
. . . . . 
The legislative process, unlike the judicial one, is a political process 
and hence particularly suited to the advancement of rights founded on 
political compromise. 
. . . . . 
                                                                                                             
40 Henri Brun & Guy Tremblay, Droit Constitutionnel, 4th ed. (Cowansville: Éditions Yvon 
Blais, 2002), at 832 [hereinafter “Brun & Tremblay”]. 
41 Id., at 862. For a review of these developments see also Ontario, Office of Francophone 
Affairs online: <http://www.ofa.gov.on.ca/en/flsa-history.html>. 
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It is public knowledge that some provinces other than New Brunswick 
— and apart from Quebec and Manitoba — were expected ultimately to 
opt into the constitutional scheme or part of the constitutional scheme 
prescribed by ss. 16 to 22 of the Charter, and a flexible form of 
constitutional amendment was provided to achieve such an advancement 
of language rights. But again, this is a form of advancement brought 
about through a political process, not a judicial one. 
If however the provinces were told that the scheme provided by ss. 
16 to 22 of the Charter was inherently dynamic and progressive, apart 
from legislation and constitutional amendment, and that the speed of 
progress of this scheme was to be controlled mainly by the courts, they 
would have no means to know with relative precision what it was that 
they were opting into. This would certainly increase their hesitation in 
so doing and would run contrary to the principle of advancement 
contained in s. 16(3). 
In my opinion, s. 16 of the Charter confirms the rule that the courts 




Michel Bastarache characterized these decisions as a “shocking 
reversal” of the Court’s earlier jurisprudence which had held that the 
purpose of the linguistic guarantees of the Constitution “was to ensure 
the full and equal access to the legislatures, the laws and the courts for 
Francophones and Anglophones alike”.
43
 For him, all constitutional 
rights reflect political compromise in the drafting details, language rights 
are fundamental in the sense that Confederation itself involved a 
fundamental bargain between French and English Canada and, more 
importantly, the Charter was intended to move the yardsticks and 
“correct present inequalities”.
44
 In particular, although Charter subsection 
16(3) expressly declares that nothing limits the authority of governments 
“to advance the equality of status or use of English and French” (Beetz 
J.’s idea of legislative advancement by some provinces), some effect 
(more than the expression of “a pious wish”)
45
 must be given to 
subsection 16(1) that declares English and French to be “the official 
                                                                                                             
42 Société des Acadiens, supra, note 38, at paras. 63-71. 
43 Bastarache, “The Dickson Perspective”, supra, note 2, at 395, quoting from Dickson 
C.J.C. in Reference re Language Rights under section 23 of the Manitoba Act 1870 and s. 133 of the 
Constitution Act, 1867, [1985] S.C.J. No. 36, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721 (S.C.C.). 
44 Bastarache, “The Dickson Perspective”, id., at 400-401. 
45 Michel Bastarache, “The Principle of Equality of the Official Languages”, c. 8 in 
Bastarache, ed., Language Rights in Canada (Montreal: Éditions Yvon Blais, 1986) translated by 
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languages of Canada” with “equality of status and equal rights” in their 
use in federal institutions: 
In refusing to look at the clear meaning of section 16(1), the Court 
transformed section 16 in its entirety into a principle of progression 
towards equality rather than accepting that it formed the fixed basis for 
a constitutional right. 
Looking at language rights through an equality rights lens is the 
central recurrent theme of Michel Bastarache’s analysis over the decades 
of his interest in this topic. This is not an obvious approach despite the 
presence of the word “equal” in the constitutional text, given the significant 
demographic qualifications on the rights even apart from the considerations 
articulated by Beetz J.
46
 As the Supreme Court of Canada put it in Mahe: 
A notion of equality between Canada’s official language groups is 
obviously present in s. 23. Beyond this, however, the section is, if 
anything, an exception to the provisions of ss. 15 and 27 in that it 
accords these groups, the English and the French, special status in 
comparison to all other linguistic groups in Canada.
47
 
Rather than viewing the language guarantees of the Constitution as 
an exception to equality, Michel Bastarache views them as the fulfilment 
of equality in the specific Canadian context. Although he concludes that 
section 15 of the Charter adds very little to the advancement of language 
rights,
48
 it is on grounds that it is superfluous as it “is not necessary in 




Using an equality paradigm is more than semantics. For Michel 
Bastarache, language rights are a subset of minority rights that give rise 
to an entitlement to substantive equality beyond freedom from 
discrimination; language rights entail significant positive obligations 
beyond mere provision of services in the minority language. As he 
explains it, language rights are not primarily about providing services to 
individuals in the minority language. Rather they are intended to promote 
                                                                                                             
46 While Charter s. 16(1) recognizes equality of English and French, s. 20 limits the right to 
communication and services in the minority language only where demographics warrant. 
47 Mahe v. Alberta, supra, note 27, at 369 (S.C.C.); Michel Bastarache represented 
l’Association canadienne-française de l’Alberta (his role in this case was described as having 
“attracted the greatest admiration” in The Great Names of the French-Canadian Community: see 
online: <http://franco.ca/edimage/grandspersonnages/en/carte_v04.html>. 
48 Bastarache, “The Principle of Equality”, supra, note 45, at 519, where he states that he 
favours the view that discrimination on the grounds of language would be an analogous ground. 
49 Id. 
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… les régimes linguistiques … visent … la reconnaissance de 
communautés linguistiques et l’aménagement de régimes leur 
permettant de se développer en harmonie avec la majorité.
51
 
In the context of the French-language minority community outside 
Quebec, substantive equality with the majority requires positive state 
action to fight the inevitable forces of assimilation faced as members of 
the minority seek to obtain the benefits of participating fully in public 
affairs at the cost of their linguistic and cultural identity:
52
 
Assimilation is both linguistic and cultural. It is a process under which 
the minority will lose control of its language and fundamental cultural 
values and substitute for these those of the dominant linguistic group. 
Fighting assimilation, therefore, requires a degree of linguistic 
institutional completeness which, I submit, can only be achieved 
through meaningful constitutional protection.
53
 
In other words, “language rights can only be fully realized through 
the development of infrastructures essential to the survival of a language 
minority as a collectivity”.
54
 
While Beetz J.’s response to the controversial nature of language 
rights in Canada was the adoption of a posture of restraint, Michel 
Bastarache offers the opposite response: judicial activism. Consistent 
with his view of language rights as a minority equality rights issue, he 
argues that the official language minority cannot be left to majority rule: 
To hand over any meaningful progression to the legislatures is to refuse 
to recognize that demographic realities make it impossible for official 
language minorities to exercise the type of political influence that is 
necessary to achieve this.
55
  
In support, he cites the decisions of the Alberta and Saskatchewan 
governments to revoke the application of a provision equivalent to 
section 133 which the Supreme Court of Canada decided in 1988 applied 
                                                                                                             
50 Michel Bastarache, “Introduction”, c. 1 in Bastarache, ed., Language Rights in Canada, 
2d ed., supra, note 29, at 5-6. 
51 Bastarache, “L’Égalité réelle des communautés”, supra, note 23, at 18. 
52 Id., at 17. 
53 Bastarache, “The Dickson Perspective”, supra, note 2, at 400. 
54 Bastarache, “The Principle of Equality”, supra, note 45, at 523. See also Bastarache, 
“L’Égalité réelle des communautés”, supra, note 23, at 17. 
55 Bastarache, “The Dickson Perspective”, supra, note 2, at 402. 
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to them since their entry into Confederation.
56
 In his view, where 
governments fail to act, the courts must: 
Possibly the most difficult task will involve balancing the need for 
greater judicial intervention in these matters against the need to respect 




It is also obvious that a great many legislatures are now turning to the 
courts to avoid taking on their true responsibilities. … Regrettable as 
that may be in political theory, it is happening and, therefore, requires a 
strong principled approach by the courts.
58
 
To refuse any form of judicial activism in the area of language rights is 
to repeat the errors of the beginning of the century in the interpretation 
of section 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867 [denying any linguistic 
protection within the denominational school right guarantee].
59
 
2. Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada 
The Honourable Michel Bastarache was appointed to the Supreme 
Court of Canada on September 30, 1997, two years after his appointment 
to the New Brunswick Court of Appeal. He served on Canada’s highest 
Court for a little over a decade until his retirement on June 30, 2008. It is 
fair to say that he remained a champion of French language rights while 
on the Bench. 
(a) The New Trilogy 
Prior to his appointment, Michel Bastarache had vigorously criticized 
Beetz J.’s interpretative approach to language rights articulated in Société 
des Acadiens,
60
 McDonald v. Montreal (City)
61
 and Bilodeau v. Manitoba.
62
 
He wrote that these decisions “created a great deal of anguish for official 
                                                                                                             
56 Id.; R. v. Mercure, supra, note 27 (Michel Bastarache acted for the appellant and principal 
parties: The Fédération des francophones hors Québec, the Association canadienne-française de 
l’Alberta and the Association culturelle franco-canadienne de la Saskatchewan). 
57 Bastarache, “The Principle of Equality”, supra, note 45, at 524. 
58 Bastarache, “The Dickson Perspective”, supra, note 2, at 402. 
59 Id., at 401. 
60 Supra, note 38. 
61 Supra, note 39. 
62 [1986] S.C.J. No. 27, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 449 (S.C.C.), following McDonald v. Montreal 
(City), id., that Manitoba summonses may be issued in either official language. 
392 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2009), 47 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
language minorities in Canada”.
63
 Within three years of his appointment 
to the Supreme Court, Justice Bastarache was able to overturn this trilogy 
and replace it with his own:  
Over a dozen years later, however, a new trilogy would revive language 
rights in Canada. The three cases to be noted are the Secession 
Reference, R. v. Beaulac, and Arsenault-Cameron.
64
  
(i) Quebec Secession Reference 
Within his first year at the Supreme Court, the Court issued its 
remarkable opinion in Reference re Secession of Quebec
65
 which, 
coupled with its earlier opinion on judicial independence the preceding 
year,
66
 suggested that legislation could be struck down despite 
compliance with the provisions of the Constitution where there was non-
compliance with unknown principles that could be said to underlie the 
Constitution.
67
 The decision, while viewed as politically astute, gave rise 
to serious concerns on the legitimacy of judicial review: 
… there is reason to believe that it is the Québec Secession Reference 
rather than the Provincial Court Judges Cases that poses the greater 
challenge to the legitimacy of judicial review in Canada. … it also 
suggests that the reasoning process to be used by the courts in the 
filling of “gaps” can be such as to leave the courts with a relatively free 
hand to devise such rules as in their view best reflect the underlying or 
organizing principles of the Constitution.
68
 
Among the underlying principles that may “give rise to substantive 
legal obligations”,
69
 of particular significance to language rights is the 
principle of the protection of minorities. That principle was derived from 
the constitutional guarantees at Confederation respecting denominational 
schools, language rights and regional representation in the Senate, as 
well as from the more recently entrenched rights found in the 
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Constitution Act, 1982 (the Charter as well as Aboriginal and treaty 
rights).
70
 Professor Elliot has articulated a distinction between principles 
“that arise by necessary implication from the text of the Constitution and 
principles that merely serve to explain the presence of textual 
provisions”.
71
 He characterizes the minority rights principle as one that is 
merely explanatory of the text, that is, explains why we have the text 
without implying more: 
No attempt is made in the Québec Secession Reference to define the 
precise nature and scope of the protection that is to be afforded to 
minority rights by this principle above and beyond that afforded by the 




Writing extrajudicially, Justice Bastarache referred to the Secession 
Reference for the proposition that the respect for minorities is a 
fundamental value of our federation and that: “Le respect de la diversité 
linguistique et culturelle est donc au centre de nos préoccupations 
comme nation.”
73
 In its later decision interpreting the scope of the 
criteria to be a rights holder within the meaning of Charter section 23, the 
anonymous court opinion relies on the Secession Reference for the 
conclusion that: 
… the presence of two distinct language communities in Canada and 
the desire to reserve an important place for them in Canadian life 




(ii) R. v. Beaulac 
One year after the Secession Reference, Bastarache J. wrote the 
majority opinion in R. v. Beaulac,
75
 undoubtedly a tour de force that 
marks a new watershed in the interpretation of language rights in 
Canada. More than any other case, Beaulac epitomizes Bastarache J.’s 
language rights legacy. As he states himself in the foreword to the second 
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At issue, was the question of whether the accused was entitled under 
section 530 of the Criminal Code
77
 to a trial before a bilingual judge and 
jury. While subsection 530(1) grants the accused an absolute right in this 
regard, subsection 530(4) makes an exception if the application has not 
been made in a timely way and a refusal would satisfy “the best interests 
of justice”. While the Court was unanimous in its interpretation of 
section 530, the significance of the case lies in Bastarache J.’s obiter 
dicta.  
While Lamer C.J.C. and Binnie J. agreed with Bastarache J. in 
concurring reasons that language rights are to be interpreted purposively, 
they took issue with Bastarache J.’s reversal of Beetz J.’s language rights 
legacy. They reiterated Beetz J.’s concerns that a large and liberal 
interpretation would discourage the incremental and progressive 
legislative expansion of language rights through the political process: 
A re-assessment of the Court’s approach to Charter language rights 
developed in Société des Acadiens and reiterated in subsequent cases is 
not necessary or desirable in this appeal which can and should be 
resolved according to the ordinary principles of statutory interpretation …
78
 
The demolition of Beetz J.’s approach to the interpretation of 
language rights could not be more complete. Taking up the arguments he 
had raised in his legal writings many years earlier criticizing Beetz J.’s 
approach, Bastarache J. turns the jurisprudence around 180 degrees: 
Language rights must in all cases be interpreted purposively, in a 
manner consistent with the preservation and development of official 
language communities in Canada. … To the extent that Société des 
Acadiens … stands for a restrictive interpretation of language rights, it 
is to be rejected.
79
  
With respect to Beetz J.’s view that language rights should be 
interpreted with restraint because they are less fundamental than other 
rights and based on political compromise, Bastarache J. concludes the 
opposite: language rights are fundamental and in any event all rights are 
based on political compromise and so “the existence of a political 
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The official language provisions of the Charter lack a harmonious 
internal consistency. While subsection 16(1) declares that English and 
French have “equality of status and equal rights and privileges as to their 
use” in all federal institutions, subsection 16(3) provides that nothing 
limits the authority of the federal or provincial governments to “advance 
the equality of status or use of English and French”. The right to advance 
the equality of status or use of the official languages in the federal 
domain, suggests that section 16(1) is not as effective as it might seem. 
Similarly, the express limits on the scope of each of the rights contained 
in sections 17, 18, 19 and 20 of the Charter also belie the full equality of 
both official languages even at the federal level. 
In light of this context, Beetz J. concluded that the progressive 
legislative advancement of language rights promoted under subsection 
16(3) should inform and limit the concept of the equality of official 
languages contained in subsection 16(1). Justice Bastarache categorically 
concludes that this “idea … must also be rejected”.
81
 For Bastarache J., 
the reconciliation lies in the recognition that while language rights may 
be circumscribed by the very text of the Charter that guarantees the right, 
whatever is expressed in the text should be interpreted broadly in light of 
substantive equality between the two official languages: 
The principle of advancement does not however exhaust s. 16 which 
formally recognizes the principle of equality of the two official 
languages of Canada. … Equality does not have a lesser meaning in 
matters of language. With regard to existing rights, equality must be 
given true meaning.  
. . . . . 
This subsection [16(1)] affirms the substantive equality of those 
constitutional language rights that are in existence at a given time.
82
 
Finally, Bastarache J. dismisses as irrelevant Beetz J.’s concern that 
a more generous interpretation of language rights would discourage 
provinces from a progressive legislative expansion of language rights: 
The fear that a liberal interpretation of language rights will make 
provinces less willing to become involved in the geographical extension 
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of those rights is inconsistent with the requirement that language rights 
be interpreted as a fundamental tool for the preservation and protection 
of official language communities where they do apply.
83
 
In a nutshell, Beaulac reverses the restrained interpretative approach 
articulated in Société des Acadiens, and imposes a liberal and generous 
rule of construction that requires substantive equality as the new norm 
subject only to the requirement that the existence of a right first be 
established. In the context of judicial bilingualism, the default is the right 
to access, and the state must establish the appropriate infrastructure 
necessary to permit the full exercise of the right: 
Where institutional bilingualism in the courts is provided for, it refers 
to equal access to services of equal quality for members of both official 
language communities in Canada.
84
  
It also means that the exercise of language rights must not be 
considered exceptional [i.e. “it is the norm”
85
], or as something in the 
nature of a request for accommodation.
86
  
Therefore, it is the denial of the application [for a bilingual judge and 
jury] that is exceptional and that needs to be justified. The burden of 
this demonstration should fall on the Crown.
87
  
I wish to emphasize that mere administrative inconvenience is not a 
relevant factor. The availability of court stenographers and court 
reporters, the workload of bilingual prosecutors or judges, the 
additional financial costs of rescheduling are not to be considered 
because the existence of language rights requires that the government 
comply with the provisions of the Act by maintaining a proper 
institutional infrastructure and providing services in both official 




Less than a year after Beaulac, the Court decided its third case with 
significant ramifications for minority language rights. The Court’s 
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opinion in Arsenault-Cameron v. Prince Edward Island
89
 was written by 
Major and Bastarache JJ. The case involved a challenge to the Minister 
of Education’s refusal to approve the establishment of a school facility in 
Summerside, P.E.I. on the grounds that the student population was too 
small and that it was preferable for such students to travel to a pre-
existing French language school located in another community 28 km 
away. The Minister had decided that a school facility with fewer than 
100 students was not pedagogically viable and that bus transportation to 
the facility in the nearby community was reasonable by provincial 
standards. The French-language school board disagreed and so did the 
Supreme Court of Canada. 
Section 23 of the Charter guarantees minority-language instruction 
where numbers warrant and instruction in minority-language educational 
facilities where numbers warrant. In this case, there was no disagreement 
that the number of potential students (held to be between 49 and 155) 
warranted French-language instruction. The issue was whether these 
numbers warranted instruction in a facility in Summerside rather than in 
the existing facility 28 km away.  
The Court held that the Minister erred in looking at the matter from 
his perspective or that of the majority and not from the perspective of the 
minority. From the perspective of the minority, the potential student 
population was pedagogically viable and the alternative of bus 
transportation meant in practice that parents would rather keep their 
children in English-language facilities (including French immersion) at 
home than subject them to a long bus ride. 
Relying on equality rights concepts, the Court emphasized the need 
for substantive rather than formal equality, which means equality 
sometimes requires different treatment rather than like treatment. In 
particular, the objective standards of the majority cannot merely be 
transplanted onto the needs of the minority: 
Section 23 is premised on the fact that substantive equality requires that 
official language minorities be treated differently, if necessary, 
according to their particular circumstances and needs, in order to 
provide them with a standard of education equivalent to that of the 
official language minority. 
. . . . . 
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The pedagogical requirements established to address the needs of the 
majority language students cannot be used to trump cultural and 
linguistic concerns appropriate for the minority language students.
90
 
As the Court had previously held in Mahe, “the majority cannot be 
expected to understand and appreciate … [the needs] of the minority”.
91
 
In this case, the Court concluded that there was a reasonable difference 
of opinion as to the pedagogical needs of the students. In that event, the 
Court held that “it is up to the board, as it represents the minority official 




The Court held that the location of the school facility is an issue that 
“pertains to the preservation and flourishing of the linguistic  
community”.
93
 This conclusion was supported by the fact that, unlike 
majority-language students, French-language students in P.E.I. had a 
practical choice between attending a French-language school or an 
English-language school if the prospect of bus transportation was 
unacceptable. Most critically, in the Court’s opinion: 
… the choice of travel would have an impact on the assimilation of the 
minority language children while travel arrangements had no cultural 
impact on majority language children.
94
 
Unlike most Charter rights which typically do not impose a positive 
obligation on the state,
95
 language rights typically do. Section 23 of the 
Charter, in particular, imposes significant obligations on the provinces to 
ensure access to minority-language education. The decision in Arsenault-
Cameron builds upon the Court’s earlier decisions on section 23, and 
places the emphasis on substantive equality and the state’s positive 
obligation to actively resist the natural forces of assimilation: 
In Mahe … this Court affirmed that language rights cannot be separated 
from a concern for the culture associated with the language and that s. 
23 was designed to correct, on a national scale, the historically 
progressive erosion of official language groups and to give effect to the 
equal partnership of the two official language groups in education … 
Section 23 therefore mandates that provincial governments do whatever 
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(iv) Criteria to Access Minority Language Rights 
As noted above, both the right to minority-language education and 
the right to French-language services from the federal government 
depend in part on demographic demand. Writing extra-judicially, Justice 
Bastarache argues that while it is natural to consider a cost-benefit 
analysis of the extension of minority language rights, it ignores the more 
fundamental value that linguistic and cultural security are too important 
to be left in the hands of the majority: 
Lorsque l’on est trop tenté de mesurer l’étendue des droits en fonction 
du nombre de locuteurs qui les réclament, on s’éloigne en même temps 
des notions de droits collectifs et de sécurité linguistique. On revient 
nécessairement à une notion d’intérêt supérieure de la majorité et 
d’évaluation des droits selon une analyse coût-bénéfice. … La question 
fondamentale dans notre société est celle de savoir si la sécurité 
linguistique des différents groupes de langues officielles est une valeur 
suffisamment importante, dons la reconnaissance est justifiée, pour que 
l’on impose des devoirs à tous les autres groupes et que l’on élimine le 




He has also said that the enactment of statutory and constitutional 
language rights reduces discretionary decision-making and serves the 
public interest by removing these issues from the political arena where 
they serve to divide the community.
98
 Justice Bastarache also argues 
against giving too much import to demographics on the basis of the 
Court’s recognition of the underlying constitutional principle of the 
protection of minorities in the Secession Reference: 
This statement means that minority rights are not subject to re-
evaluation according to changes in demography, nor are they subject to 
a restrictive interpretation because of new political realities.
99
 
In Solski v. Quebec,
100
 the Supreme Court of Canada held that 
Charter section 23(2) guarantees that where a child has received a 
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“significant part” of his or her education in a minority-language school, 
that child and his or her siblings have a right to continue to attend 
minority-language schools. The Court read down the legislative provision 
of Quebec’s education law that limited the right to circumstances where 
the child had received a “major part” of his or her education in that 
system.  
The anonymous opinion of the Court acknowledges that the 
interpretation of language rights must take into account the different 
context of the Anglophone minority in Quebec (e.g., that they are part of 
the broader majority of Canada and face less risk of assimilation).
101
 This 
implies that the scope for other provinces imposing limits on the criteria 
for admission to minority-language schools is likely smaller. However, 
even in Quebec, where more rigid criteria may be imposed in order to 
promote the French-language majority, limits must reflect the individual 
right component (beyond the collective right component) that recognizes 
the sense of belonging to a particular linguistic community. 
(b) Meaningful Remedies 
Traditionally, courts issue orders and declarations and parties, 
including governments, obey them. In Mahe, Dickson C.J.C. recognized 
that governments should be accorded considerable discretion in how they 
meet their minority-language educational right obligations.
102
 In Doucet-
Boudreau v. Nova Scotia,
103
 Bastarache J. joined with the majority 
opinion written by Iacobucci and Arbour JJ. which held that in unusual 
circumstances, courts could depart dramatically from the traditional 
approach to remedies. At issue was whether a judge could or should 
order the government to build schools within certain deadlines, report 
back on the progress of construction and retain jurisdiction over the case 
until the judge was satisfied of compliance. Under the unusual 
circumstances of the case, the majority upheld the judge’s “supervisory 
order” as a reasonable exercise of his authority to provide a responsive 
and effective remedy. 
The Court was unimpressed by the recurrent delays in the fulfilment 
of section 23 rights. The case had been commenced in 1998, some 16 
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years following the enactment of the Charter and several years following 
considerable parental pressure to construct schools. Even after the 
commencement of legal proceedings, an official moratorium on 
construction was imposed in 1999 pending further review. The majority 
emphasized the remedial nature of section 23, including the goal of 
“halting the progressive erosion of minority official language cultures” 
as well as “actively promoting their flourishing”.
104
 The Court noted in 
particular, the critical risks that delay posed to the survival of the 
Francophone minority: 
Another distinctive feature of the right in s. 23 is that the “numbers 
warrant” requirement leaves minority language education rights 
particularly vulnerable to government delay or inaction. For every 
school year that governments do not meet their obligations under s. 23, 
there is an increased likelihood of assimilation which carries the risk 
that numbers might cease to “warrant”.
105
 
In this regard, the Court relied on lower court judgments, including 
one argued by then counsel Michel Bastarache, providing for affirmative 
remedies to ensure prompt remedial action by the government: 
The affirmative promise contained in s. 23 of the Charter and the 
critical need for timely compliance will sometimes require courts to 
order affirmative remedies to guarantee that language rights are 
meaningfully, and therefore necessarily promptly, protected.
106
  
In light of the majority’s finding of recurring delays in the province 
fulfilling its constitutional obligations and the irreparable harm suffered 
by the minority language community, the Court upheld what it described 
as an original and novel order as an appropriate and just remedy within 
the meaning of section 24 of the Charter.  
(c) Discrimination on Grounds of Language 
Section 15 of the Charter guarantees the equal benefit of the law 
without discrimination on enumerated and analogous grounds. While 
national and ethnic origin are enumerated grounds, language is not. In 
the first edition of his language rights text, Michel Bastarache argued that 
language should constitute an analogous ground in light of the “parallel 
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between language and ‘national or ethnic origin’” as well as its inclusion 
in various international instruments.
107
  
It is important to note that Michel Bastarache’s argument that 
language constitutes an analogous ground must still be understood and 
limited by the context of other constitutional provisions guaranteeing 
official language rights. Similarly, the notion of discrimination itself 
contains internal qualifiers that account for practical realities. As Michel 
Bastarache pointed out in his text, non-discrimination clauses are 
intended to protect individual rights rather than collective interests and so 
quite rightly do not prevent the provision of state-funded education in 
one language only in part of the state’s territory.
108
 As noted by others, 
equality rights cannot require the state to respond to the language 
proficiencies of every resident without absurd results.
109
 As the Ontario 
Court of Appeal put it: “All government documents will inevitably be 
unreadable by some group of persons. It would be trivializing s. 15 to 
declare them all discriminatory …”
110
 Since the Quebec Charter of 
Human Rights and Freedoms
111
 expressly enumerates language as a 
prohibited ground of discrimination, it has been interpreted by the 
Supreme Court of Canada to prohibit unreasonable state prohibitions on 
the use of the English language
112
 as well as to permit reasonable state-
imposed requirements to promote the use of the French language.
113
 
These issues were addressed in obiter by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in Gosselin (Tutor of) v. Quebec (Attorney General).
114
 The 
claimants were members of the Francophone majority in Quebec who 
sought access to publicly funded English-language schools contrary to 
the Quebec Charter of the French Language.
115
 Quebec education 
legislation, mirroring in this regard the minority-language educational 
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rights guarantee of section 23 of the Charter, prohibited their access for 
they were not members of the Anglophone minority holding section 23 
rights. The claims were easily rejected on principles long accepted that 
one part of the Constitution cannot be used to negate another part.
116
 
Since the purpose of the impugned education provisions was to 
implement the province’s constitutional obligation under Charter section 
23 to the Anglophone minority, the exclusion of Francophones could not 
be discriminatory under Charter section 15.
117
 
Of interest is that the Court went out of its way to comment on the 
relationship between official language rights and equality rights. In its 
anonymous opinion, the Court ignored lower court case law concluding 
that language is not an analogous ground under Charter section 15 and 
expressly agreed with the observations of the Saskatchewan Court of 
Appeal that held it might be included: 
Nor, in our view, does the presence in the Charter of the language 
provisions of ss. 16 to 20, or the deletion from an earlier draft of 
s. 15(1) of the word “language”, have the effect necessarily of excluding 
from the reach of s. 15 the form of distinction at issue in this case.
118
 
What is all the more unusual about this reference is that it arose in 
the context of the failure to proclaim into force in Saskatchewan the right 
to be tried by a bilingual judge and jury while the right had been 
proclaimed into force in some other provinces. The Court of Appeal held 
that a Francophone in Saskatchewan was the subject of discrimination 
relative to Francophones in provinces like Ontario and Manitoba where 
the provision was in force. This appears to be an attempt by the Court to 
leave the door ajar to the inclusion of language as an analogous ground: 
In Québec (Procureure générale) v. Entreprises W.F.H. Ltée, [2000] 
R.J.Q. 1222, at p. 1250, the Quebec Superior Court held that [translation] 
“maternal language” was an analogous ground. It is not necessary to 
explore this point further on this appeal because the principal issue is 
not the content of the equality rights under the Canadian Charter but, 
assuming the appellants have an arguable case to bring themselves 
within s. 15(1) of the Canadian Charter, the issue at the root of this 
appeal is the relationship of equality rights in both the Canadian 
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Charter and the Quebec Charter to the positive language guarantees 




The case is also suggestive of the hand of Bastarache J. While noting 
that official language rights may be viewed as exceptions to equality 
insofar that the official language minority is granted special rights 
granted to no others,
120
 it offers the opposite view as an alternative: 
As noted earlier, s. 23 could also be viewed not as an “exception” to 
equality guarantees but as their fulfilment in the case of linguistic 
minorities to make available an education according to their particular 
circumstances and needs equivalent to the education provided to the 
majority (Arsenault-Cameron, at para. 31).
121
 
This is a return to the recurrent theme of Justice Bastarache that 
official language rights are in effect a kind of equality between the two 
founding peoples. In fact, in the first edition of his text, he cites Professor 
Gold’s argument that the interpretation of analogous grounds under 
section 15 of the Charter should take into account grounds that are 




(d) New Brunswick Institutions 
Despite his near-universal success in persuading his colleagues on 
the Supreme Court of Canada to his view of language rights, the notable 
exception is the Court’s 5-4 decision in Charlebois v. St. John (City).
123
 
The majority held that a municipality is not an “institution” within the 
meaning of New Brunswick’s Official Languages Act
124
 for the purpose 
of the statutory requirement that the institution plead in civil proceeding 
in the language of choice of the private litigant.
125
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Writing for the majority, Charron J. held that the inclusion of a 
municipality within the meaning of the word “institution” would render 
the statutory scheme incoherent. While the definition of the word 
“institution” could include a municipality under the expression “other 
body … established to perform a governmental function by or pursuant 
to an Act of the Legislature”, other provisions made this unlikely. The 
word “municipality” was defined separately from the word “institution” 
and specific language obligations were expressly imposed upon 
municipalities that would have been superfluous had the word “institution” 
included municipalities. 
Justice Bastarache dissented on the ground that a court “must not 
adopt a restrictive interpretation” unless the legislative text is incapable 
of a broader interpretation: 
This approach is not new. It is now a template for the interpretation 
of language rights, specially, as just demonstrated, where there is 
apparent conflict and ambiguity. Under it, the first step is not to read 
down the protections to eliminate inconsistencies, but to make sense of 
the overall regime in light of the constitutional imperative of 
approaching language rights purposefully, with a view to advancing the 
principles of equality and protection of minorities. Institutional 
bilingualism is achieved when rights are granted to the public and 




Justice Charron disagreed for the majority, holding that absent true 
ambiguity in the legislative text, a broader interpretation for the sake of 
expanding language rights not within the intention of the Legislature 
constituted one step too far: 
In my respectful view, the approach … adopted by Bastarache J., 
exceeds the scope of this Court’s decision in R. v. Beaulac. … This 
Court in Beaulac held that a liberal and purposive approach to the 
interpretation of constitutional language guarantees and statutory 
language rights should be adopted in all cases. I take no issue with this 
principle; however, as Bastarache J. acknowledges (at para. 40), this 
does not mean that the ordinary rules of statutory interpretation have no 
place. In this case, it is particularly important to keep in mind the 
proper limits of Charter values as an interpretative tool. In Bell 
ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex… Iacobucci J., writing for a 
unanimous court, firmly reiterated that  
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to the extent this Court has recognized a “Charter values” 
interpretive principle, such principle can only receive 
application in circumstances of genuine ambiguity, i.e., where 
a statutory provision is subject to differing, but equally 
plausible, interpretations. [Emphasis in original; para. 62.]  
In the context of this case, resorting to this tool exemplifies how its 
misuse can effectively pre-empt the judicial review of the constitutional 
validity of the statutory provision. It risks distorting the Legislature’s 
intent and depriving it of the opportunity to justify any breach … as a 
reasonable limit. … In this respect, Daigle J.A. properly instructed 
himself and rightly found … that the contextual and purposive analysis 
of the OLA “removed all ambiguity surrounding the meaning of the 
word ‘institution’”. Absent any remaining ambiguity, Charter values 
have no role to play.
127
 
This decision raises some doubt as to the correctness of the New 
Brunswick Court of Appeal’s earlier decision that section 18(2) of the 
Charter requires municipalities to enact its by-laws in both official 
languages.
128
 In Quebec (Attorney General) v. Blaikie (No. 2),
129
 the 
Supreme Court of Canada had held that while section 133 required the 
provincial government to enact delegated legislation in both languages 
this did not apply to municipalities. In Charlebois, Charron J. was 
content to “express no opinion on whether this interpretation is 
correct”.
130
 In the second edition of his text, Justice Bastarache described 
the earlier Court of Appeal decision as a “superb recent example” of the 
new contextual interpretation which “focussed chiefly on the present 





Had then Prime Minister Jean Chrétien asked about Michel 
Bastarache prior to making his decision to appoint him to the Supreme 
Court of Canada (if not to the New Brunswick Court of Appeal two years 
earlier), he would likely have been told that, in the words of the 
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Telegraph Journal, he was “an ardent champion of language and 
minority rights”.
132
 Upon his appointment, Senator Simard paid tribute to 
him “for his boundless devotion to the Acadian community and to 
francophone minorities all across Canada”.
133
 In the House, in response 
to the Bloc Québécois complaint that the appointment was inappropriate 
given that Michel Bastarache had been co-chair of the national 
committee for the “yes” side in the Charlottetown Referendum, the 
Prime Minister responded: “if there is someone who has fought for the 
French fact before every court in Canada, it is Justice Bastarache”.
134
 
Justice Bastarache’s judicial approach to the interpretation of 
language rights is exactly as one would have predicted given his early 
writings on the subject as well as his lifelong commitment to the 
promotion of minority language rights in Canada. What is perhaps more 
surprising has been his effectiveness in persuading a majority if not most 
of his Supreme Court colleagues to his view in a short time. 
Of course, constitutional and quasi-constitutional instruments, like 
living trees, grow and develop in fits and starts and not in a linear path. 
What Justice Bastarache has done is to eliminate the restrained approach 
to the interpretation of language rights that existed upon his appointment 
to the Supreme Court. He has consistently characterized official language 
rights as “an integral part of the broader protection of minority rights”,
135
 
and interpreted them through the prism of equality rights. This has led 
him to an expansive reading of language rights even in the face of what a 
majority of his colleagues found to be a conflicting legislative intention.
136
  
We can reasonably expect that in his absence from the Bench, other 
cases will demonstrate the give and take or balancing of competing 
interests that will not always reflect his most liberal approach to the 
interpretation of language rights. For instance, in what is probably the 
first language rights case on which he did not sit,
137
 one cannot help but 
wonder where he would have landed.  
The Court unanimously held that Industry Canada’s regional 
industrial development office eventually remedied its deficiencies in 
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providing services of equal quality to the Francophone community of 
Huronia in Ontario. Despite having failed to attract the participation of 
the Francophone community in its program, the Court was not prepared 
to attribute this shortcoming to its failure to ensure linguistic equality. In 
the result, the Court refused to grant the request of CALDECH, a 
grassroots Francophone community organization, that developed as an 
alternative to Industry Canada, that it receive permanent and stable 
funding, to serve the Francophone business community in Huronia.  
Given Justice Bastarache’s commitment to the concept of institutional 
completeness (the linguistic community needs its own institutions to 
ward off assimilation), his view of the outcome is not predictable. While 
the absence of the equivalent of section 16.1 of the Charter, guaranteeing 
“distinct cultural institutions” for New Brunswick but not the federal 
government, supports the outcome, it is not determinative in light of the 




We know that Justice Bastarache’s views on linguistic rights have 
been informed by his personal experience growing up in a community 
often divided by language issues. It is apparent, that Justice Bastarache’s 
view of language rights in the particular context of Canada, places him 
comfortably in the tradition of Henri Bourassa and others who viewed 
Canada as a pact between two nations. His support of the Meech Lake 
Accord is consistent with this perspective.
139
 In his writings, he has tied 
the promotion of language rights to the goal of national unity and the 
recent anonymous decision of the Supreme Court follows suit:  
The constitutional protection of minority language rights is necessary 
for the promotion of robust and vital minority language communities 
which are essential for Canada to flourish as a bilingual country.
140 
While the legacy of a judge cannot be determined in the short term, 
there is reason to believe that the legacy of Justice Bastarache on 
language rights will be lasting, albeit perhaps not as complete as he 
would like it. His lasting legacy is a clear advancement of French 
language rights throughout Canada. 
                                                                                                             
138 Supra, note 123. 
139 Michel Bastarache, “L’Accord constitutionnel de 1987 et la protection des minorités 
francophone hors Québec” (1988-89) 34 McGill L.J. 119. 
140 Solski, supra, note 19, at para. 2, per the Court. 
 
 
 
